By John Thomas Farquhar

Greater than a device of coverage makers to assemble intelligence, Air strength reconnaissance efforts formed early chilly warfare doctrine and battle making plans. Dr. Farquhar argues lack of knowledge on Soviet strategic features ruled the association, operational making plans, and gear of the postwar Air strength. To help his statement, Farquhar lines the improvement of aerial reconnaissance from the 1st balloon ascents via global struggle II as a prelude. He then examines early chilly battle peripheral reconnaissance and overflights of the Soviet Union. He explains the evolution of intelligence-gathering know-how, bureaucratic development, and a relative loss of cognizance paid to digital war ahead of the Korean battle. established totally on archival assets, the booklet serves as a great reference for air doctrine, intelligence, and digital war within the early life of the chilly conflict.

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Extra info for A Need to Know: The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War Planning, 1945-1953

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To start, I planned to go where there was the biggest chance of finding a radar, to prove there were radars in the area. My pilot and I figured that the Hong Kong–Canton area was probably the most likely place. . We planned the first mission to go down to the Linchow Peninsular [sic], then to Canton and then home; a run of about 8 hours over enemy territory in darkness. We got over the Kowloon docks about 10 pm local time—not a peep from our receivers. We were very disappointed. Lt Uthe (the pilot) felt that the Japs in Canton were fighting in a very civilized manner, and had probably gone to bed.

We planned the first mission to go down to the Linchow Peninsular [sic], then to Canton and then home; a run of about 8 hours over enemy territory in darkness. We got over the Kowloon docks about 10 pm local time—not a peep from our receivers. We were very disappointed. Lt Uthe (the pilot) felt that the Japs in Canton were fighting in a very civilized manner, and had probably gone to bed. So, he made a couple of low level passes over 16 ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE the Kowloon docks.

Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. : Air University Press, 1989), 29. 20 ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE 24. , 28. 25. For summaries of airpower theory following World War I, see Futrell, 22–39; and The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War), 1 July 1946 in David MacIsaac, ed. (hereafter MacIsaac USSBS), 4–10. : Kennikat Press, 1971); and Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrare, reprint ed.

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A Need to Know: The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War by John Thomas Farquhar
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